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Abstract
Jakob Bernoulli, working in the late 17th century, identified a gap in contemporary prob-
ability theory. He cautioned that it was inadequate to specify force of proof (probability
of provability) for some kinds of uncertain arguments. After 300 years, this gap remains in
present-day probability theory. We present axioms analogous to Kolmogorov axioms for prob-
ability, specifying uncertainty that lies in an argument’s inference/implication itself rather
than in its premise and conclusion. The axioms focus on arguments spanning two Boolean
algebras, but generalizes the obligatory: force of proof of A implies B is the probability of
(B or not(A)) in the case that the two Boolean algebras are identical. We propose a cate-
gorical framework that relies on generalized probabilities (objects) to express uncertainty in
premises, to mix with arguments (morphisms) to express uncertainty embedded directly in
inference/implication. There is a direct application to Shafer’s evidence theory (Dempster-
Shafer theory), greatly expanding its scope for applications. Therefore, we can offer this
framework not only as an optimal solution to a difficult historical puzzle, but to advance the
frontiers of contemporary artificial intelligence.
Keywords: force of proof, probability of provability, Ars Conjectandi, non-additive proba-
bilities, evidence theory,
Introduction
The title is a nominal description by Jakob Bernoulli of his incomplete and still neglected project,
undertaken in the late 17th century. From notes preserved in “Ars Conjectandi” [1], his posthumous
manuscript (1713), it is clear that Bernoulli thought it useful to assign weights to arguments as
an indication of their adequacy, and that these weights should be associated with probabilities of
provability.
A small number of contemporary mathematicians/statisticians/historians have quarreled over
what Bernoulli intended in this discussion (e.g. Hailperin [2], Shafer [8]), so there is no clear
indication from Bernoulli himself of a natural path to completing his project.
We shall not try represent each of Bernoulli’s technical exercises within a new overarching
theory, but rather take hints from Bernoulli and his few close critics to formulate a theory of
∗The main ideas presented here, including axioms for arguments, were developed by the first author of this
report from an imaginative reading of Ars Conjectandi in 2003, after years (1987-2003) of concentrated reading
and research in AI topics, principally focused on uncertain reasoning. He is grateful to Rohit Parikh for extensive
encouragement throughout this period and dozens of brilliant and amusing lectures. An attempt to publish these
ideas in 2003 failed, and this author walked away from the “Bernoulli project” after a disagreement with a referee,
who identified no computational errors but failed to see the significance of results, to concentrate on an unrelated
project. The author’s role in the unrelated project was to provide mathematical and programming support to the
development by a colleague of a closed form calculus for portfolios of vanilla and exotic options and underlying
securities, dispensing altogether with simulations and numerical methods in pricing and hedging (see e.g. [3], [4]).
Counting on the brilliance of the design and estimating (correctly, it happens) the likelihood of the success of
the option project, the author was distracted from completing the “Bernoulli project” for over fifteen years, until
now. Substantial improvements to this “Bernoulli project” were added by collaboration of the present authors in
connection with the second author’s “case study” requirement for a Master’s Degree in Applied Mathematics in the
Department of Mathematics and Statistics, Hunter College, CUNY in 2017.
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uncertain argumentation in contemporary mathematical terms. It is our hope that this theory
will appear to the reader, even the most attentive to historical details, to be consistent with
Bernoulli’s aims. Moreover, apart from its role in solving a puzzle of considerable historical interest,
our approach to uncertain reasoning specified here will contribute powerful new techniques for
explanation-based problem-solving in artificial intelligence, by contrast to “black box” approaches
(e.g. machine learning) . Judea Pearl has written a convincing manifesto on this topic in a recent
WSJ article aimed at a wide audience [5] that ranks explanation-based approaches as inherently
higher forms of reasoning, relative to black box approaches whose limits and successes cannot be
fathomed. He is echoing concerns of users and investors who are raising questions in business
journals about the overheated culture of machine reasoning.
Hailperin and Shafer focus on different idioms of uncertain reasoning to explain Bernoulli’s ideas
about force of proof. Hailperin emphasizes the calculus of expected values, Shafer emphasizes non-
additive probabilities.
Shafer’s insight seems to be correct, but his technical analysis of Bernoulli’s project is informal
and leaves undiscovered a rich formal structure that has eluded Bernoulli’s readers for hundreds
of years. We disclose that the (non-normalized) mass functions of Shafer’s evidence theory can
play the key role in a formal solution to Bernoulli’s puzzle. These are the canonical non-additive
probability models in contemporary reasoning about uncertainty. As an application of our analysis
of Bernoulli’s problem, we greatly expand the scope of Shafer’s evidence theory. This expansion
is achieved by identifying a “category of belief functions”, within which Shafer’s compatibility
relations represent only the most rudimentary morphisms— and therefore almost all morphisms
between belief functions are missing from Shafer’s theory.
An example of Bernoulli makes it extremely unlikely that Hailperin’s calculus is correct.
Bernoulli considers the extent to which his own brother’s laziness accounts for his not writing
a letter to him when expected. Bernoulli stipulates that his brother is lazy (assumption A) and
that the letter was not written (candidate consequence C). Bernoulli raises the question: what is
the force of proof connecting A to C? There is no puzzle if the force of proof is the probability of
material implication: probability( C or not(A) ), which is 1. Evidently, this is not the answer to
Bernoulli’s question, which lies deeper. Bernoulli offers competing arguments why the expected
letter was never written (e.g. his brother might be dead), indicating a force of proof less than 1
for each of the competing arguments.
In this context, Hailperin [2] interprets Bernoulli as measuring the probabilities of A and
A =⇒ C to assess the probability of provability of C from A. For simplicity, Hailperin recommends
joint probabilities and independence, but he must then assess separately probabilities of A and
A =⇒ C, with different measures. The probability of A is 1. If A and C are to be confined to the
same Boolean algebra, the probability of A =⇒ C and the joint probability of A and A =⇒ C
are also 1. But there is no procedure in probability theory to span two Boolean algebras in such a
calculation. Hailperin needs a better explanation at this point of analysis or this gap counts as an
error.
The gap in Hailperin’s explanation is the starting point of our approach. We propose two
new closely-related idioms of uncertain reasoning, uncertain inference arguments and uncertain
implication arguments, that directly address the question of force of proof of arguments from
propositions of one Boolean algebra to propositions of another. A sure sign of success in such an
approach is to axiomatize consistency of such assignments in the style of Kolmogorov’s axioms for
probability in an indefeasible way. We have taken this imaginative leap and the axioms must be
challenged if our approach is to fail. We believe these axioms are “ineluctable” and don’t foresee
such a challenge.
Notation and Definitions
Let A be a finite Boolean algebra. FA and TA represent the least and greatest element of A . All
Boolean algebras are finite in this report, though almost all results can be extended to non-finite
cases.
If A is an element of A , let AC represents the complement of A, n(A) represents the number of
elements in A or the distance to the least element of A .
If A1 and A2 are elements of A , A1 =⇒ A2 means A
C
1 ∨A2 = TA .
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If A1 and A2 are elements of A , an argument from A1 to A2 is a triple, (A1, A2, p(A
C
1 ∨ A2),
where p: A→ [0, 1] is a probability function. p(AC1 ∨A2) is the force of proof of the argument.
If A and B are Boolean algebras, an argument from A to B is a function:
FP : A ×B → [0, 1]
satisfying conditions: for all A,A1, A2 in A and B,B1, B2 in B,
i. FP (FA , B) = 1
ii. FP (A, TB) = 1
iii. FP (TA , FB) = 0
iv. If A1 =⇒ A2, FP (A1, B) ≥ FP (A2, B)
v. If B1 =⇒ B2, FP (A,B1) ≤ FP (A,B2)
If FP is an argument from A to B, define
−−→
FP : A ×B → [0, 1] by: for all A in A , B in B,
−−→
FP (A,B) =
∑
A =⇒ A
(−1)n(A)−n(A)FP (A,B)
If FP is an argument from A to B, define
←−−
FP : A ×B → [0, 1] by: For all A in A , B in B,
←−−
FP (A,B) =
∑
B =⇒ B
(−1)n(B)−n(B)FP (A,B)
If
−−→
FP ≥ 0, FP is an uncertain implication argument. If
←−−
FP ≥ 0, FP is an uncertain
inference argument.
If FP is neither an uncertain inference argument nor an uncertain implication argument, FP is
said to be a superficial argument.
If the values of FP are 0 or 1, the argument is said to discrete. If FP is an uncertain implication
argument or an uncertain inference argument, the values of
−−→
FP or
←−−
FP must be discrete as well.
We shall see that uncertain implication arguments can be composed, uncertain inference arguments
can be composed, but superficial arguments cannot be composed. That is to say, a superficial
argument is not entirely without merit: it can be advanced to “make a point”, but cannot be used
in a chain of reasoning.
Theorem 1. In particular, from the axioms and definitions it is easily seen that:
∑
A∈A
−−→
FP (A,B) = 1
and
∑
B∈B
←−−
FP (A,B) = 1
Thus, if FP is an uncertain implication or an uncertain implication argument then
−−→
FP or
←−−
FP is
a (not-necessarily-normalized) mass function parametrized by elements of a Boolean algebra. A
mass function is a map from a Boolean algebra to [0,1], the sum of whose values is 1.0, and is
normalized if 0.0 is assigned to the minimal element (empty set/ false). Arguments can be viewed
as mass functions parametrized by elements of Boolean algebras.
If FP is an an argument from Boolean algebra A to Boolean algebra B, and FP (A,B) > 0 implies
A = FA , A = TA , B = FB or B = TB for all A in A and B in B, then FP is said to be not
probative. Otherwise, FP is said to be probative.
If FP is not probative, A and B are said to be tangential with respect to FP. Otherwise, A
and B are said to be entangled with respect to FP.
Arguments are subjective constructions associated with voluntary deliberation, but most pairs of
Boolean algebras would be treated as tangential if this deliberation were forced. E.g a Boolean
3
algebra of propositions about contemporary music would almost certainly be treated as tangential
when coupled with a Boolean algebra of propositions about metastable states in physics. However,
a Boolean algebra of propositions about ethnicity and a Boolean algebra of propositions about
nationality have a better chance of being treated as entangled by a social scientist.
Contrapositive Arguments
If A and B are Boolean algebras, and FP is an argument from A to B, then the contrapositive
of FP,
C(FP ) : B ×A → [0, 1]
is defined by: for A in A , B in B,
C(FP )(B,A) = FP (AC , BC)
The following are easily proven:
i. C(FP) is an argument from B to A ;
ii. C(C(FP)) = FP;
iii. if FP is an uncertain inference argument, C(FP) is an uncertain implication argument
iv. if FP is an uncertain implication argument, C(FP) is an uncertain inference argument.
The Prototypical Example
Our constructions gain legitimacy if they are consistent with probability of provability in the case
of a single Boolean algebra, and indeed they are:
Theorem 2. Let A be a Boolean algebra, pA a probability measure on A . Define FPpA : A×A →
[0, 1] by: for A1 , A2 in A ,
FPpA (A1, A2) = pA (A
C
1 ∨A2)
Then FPpA is an uncertain implication argument and an uncertain inference argument.
An elementary but tedious proof of Theorem 2 is postponed to an appendix.
A Class of Uncertain Implication Arguments that are also Un-
certain Inference Arguments:
Let A be the Boolean algebra of subsets of set {a1, a2, . . . , am} and B be the Boolean algebra
of subsets of {b1, b2, . . . , bn} for positive integers m and n. For 1 ≤ i ≤ m and 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
define FP ({ai} , {bj}) = pi,j ≥ 0 in such a way that
∑j=n
j=1 pi,j = 1, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. For {ai}
a singleton in A and B in B, let FP ({ai} , B) =
∑
bj∈B
pi,j . For A in A and B in B, let
FP (A,B) = Πai∈AFP ({ai} , B).
It follows easily that
−−→
FP (A,B) = FP (A,B) ∗ Π{ai∈AC}1.0 − FP ({ai} , B) lies in [0,1]. (This
generalizes: 1 - x - y + xy = (1 - x)(1 - y) and x - xy = x(1 - y)). Thus FP is an uncertain
implication argument . If A is FA , generally
←−−
FP (A,B) is not 0, so the mass functions associated
with elements of A are not necessarily normalized.
In computing
←−−
FP (A,B) for A in A and B in B, we must expand multivariate polynomials in
variables pi,j , as defined in the previous paragraph.
Lemma 1. For real numbers, x1,1, x2,1, x2,1, x2,2,
i. the monomials in the expansion of the polynomial (x1,1 + x2,1)(x2,1 + x2,2) appear in the
expansion of the polynomial (x1,1 + x1,2 + x1,3)(x2,1 + x2,2 + x2,3) for any real numbers x1,3,
x2,3.
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ii. any product of linear polynomials whose monomials contain the monomials of the expansion
of polynomial (x1,1 + x1,2)(x2,1 + x2,2) has the form (x1,1 + x1,2 + x1,3)(x2,1 + x2,2+ x2,3) for
some real numbers x1,3, x2,3.
From an obvious generalization of the Lemma, It can be shown that for B1 and B2 disjoint,
monomials in the expansion of FP (A,B1) will appear in the expansion of FP (A,B1 ∨ B2) and
not in the expansion of FP (A,B) for any B that cannot be represented as B1 ∨ B2. In the
expansion of
←−−
FP (A,B), for B1 ∨B2 contained in B, these monomials will appear with alternating
signs, with increasing numbers of instances as B2 increases in size. The classic binomial expansion
(1− 1)n(B)−n(B1) = 0 =
∑
B2⊆B−B1
(
n(B −B1)
n(B2)
)
(−1)n(B−B1)−n(B2) ensures that the monomials
will appear in
←−−
FP (A,B) with 0 coefficient, unless B and B1 are equal, when the coefficients are
1. In any case, the sum of these monomials is the sum of some of the monomials of FP(A, B),
and is therefore in [0, 1], since FP(A, B) is in [0,1]. Moreover, the monomials of FP(A, B) have
coefficient 1 in
←−−
FP (A,B), so they do not contribute to
←−−
FP (A,FB) and the mass function
←−−
FP (A, ·)
is normalized.
Categories of Mass Functions
Let A be a Boolean algebra, mA : A → [0, 1] be a mass function. Let B be also a Boolean algebra
and FP(A, B) an uncertain inference argument. Let mB : B → [0, 1] be defined by:
mB(B) =
∑
A∈A
mA (A) ∗
←−−
FP (A,B)
It follows that
∑
B∈B mB(B) =
∑
B∈B
∑
A∈A mA (A) ∗
←−−
FP (A,B) = 1 and therefore mB : B →
[0, 1] is a mass function.
If
←−−
FP (A, ·) is normalized, mB(FB) = 0, and mB is normalized, whether or not mA is.
On the other hand, let B be a Boolean algebra, mB : B → [0, 1] be a mass function. Let A also
be a Boolean algebra and FP(A, B) an uncertain implication argument. Let mA : A → [0, 1] be
defined by:
mA (A) =
∑
B∈B
mB(B) ∗
−−→
FP (A,B)
It follows that
∑
A∈A mA (A) =
∑
A∈A
∑
B∈B mB(B)∗
−−→
FP (A,B) = 1, and therefore thatmA (A) :
A → [0, 1] is a mass function.
If
−−→
FP (·, B) is normalized, mA (FA ) = 0, and mA is normalized, whether or not mB is.
Suppose A ,B, and C are Boolean algebras, FPA ,B : A ×B → [0, 1] and FPB,C : B×C → [0, 1]
are uncertain inference arguments. Let mA : A → [0, 1] be a mass function. Let mC : C → [0, 1]
be the mass function defined by:
mC (C) =
∑
B∈B
∑
A∈A
mA (A) ∗
←−−
FPA ,B(A,B) ∗
←−−
FPB,C (B,C)
for C in C .
This construction defines the composition of
←−−
FPB,C (B, ·) with
←−−
FPA ,B(A, ·)
Suppose A ,B, and C are Boolean algebras, FPA ,B : A ×B → [0, 1] and FPB,C : B×C → [0, 1]
are uncertain implication arguments. mA : A → [0, 1] be the mass function defined by:
mA (A) =
∑
B∈B
∑
C∈C
mC (C) ∗
−−→
FPA ,B(A,B) ∗
−−→
FPB,C (B,C)
for A in A .
This construction defines the composition of
−−→
FPB,C (·, C) with
−−→
FPA ,B(·, B).
Morphisms in a category must compose. We have therefore constructed two categories
of mass functions, associated with implication arguments and inference arguments and two sub-
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categories of normalized mass functions, associated with normalized implication arguments and
normalized inference arguments.
It is noteworthy that a category of normalized mass functions is equivalent to a category of belief
functions, in the sense of Shafer [6], which does not use the formalism of category theory. Elsewhere
([7]) Shafer introduces compatibility relations between Boolean algebras specifically for the purpose
of transferring weight from functions on the first Boolean algebra to belief functions of the second.
These can be interpreted as morphisms in the sense introduced here, and will be discussed in the
next section.
In ([7]) Shafer indicates a revised view (relative to [6]) that these morphisms are the primary
subject of his theory of uncertain reasoning, not the belief functions apart from their association
with compatibility relations. Therefore, it can be said that our implementation of Bernoulli’s
project encompasses a strict generalization of the latest official version of Dempster-Shafer theory.
It remains to be seen in the next section what is the scope of this generalization.
Compatibility Relations as Morphisms
Let A and B be Boolean algebras. A compatibility relation between A and B is a relation CR
in A ×B satisfying:
i. FA CR B for B in B if and only if B = FB
ii. TA CR B for B in B if B is not FB
iii. A CR FB for A in A if and only if A = FA
iv. A CR TB for A in A if A is not FA
v. A CR B1 ∨B2 if and only if A CR B1 or A CR B2 for A in A and B1, B2 in B
vi. A CR B1 ∧B2 if and only if A CR B1 and A CR B2 for A in A and B1, B2 in B
vii. A1 ∨ A2 CR B if and only if A1 CR B or A2 CR B for A1, A2 in A and B in B
viii. A1 ∧ A2 CR B if and only if A1 CR B and A2 CR B for A1, A2 in A and B in B
If CR is a compatibility relation between A and B, define FPCR : A ×B → [0, 1] as follows:
For A in A , B in B,
i. FPCR(A,B) = 1 if A CR B and not( A CR B
C)
ii. FPCR(A,B) = 1 if A = FA
iii. FPCR(A,B) = 0 if not i or ii.
It should be noted that in the case A = B, FPCR(A,B) = 1 if and only if A
C ∧B = TA . In the
general case, FPCR is easily seen to satisfy the axioms of an uncertain implication argument.
These compatibility relations illustrate discrete arguments. Since the computation of
−−→
FPCR(A,B)
from FPCR(A,B) involves only sums of 0’s and 1’s, and values lie between 0 and 1, all values of
−−→
FPCR(A,B) must be 0 or 1.
In Shafer’s most recent summary ([8]) of his views on Dempster-Shafer theory, he claims the
principal focus should be such compatibility relations between Boolean algebras decorated with
probability measures (for A ) and belief functions (for B).
This sparse set of “morphisms” sits inside our category of normalized mass functions with normal-
ized uncertain implication arguments, almost all of whose innumerable morphisms were introduced
here for the first time. It remains to be seen if this greatly expanded scope will be helpful in ap-
plications, but it represents a theoretical breakthrough in belief function calculus.
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Summary
We have exhumed informal notes from Jakob Bernoulli’s famous tract, Ars Conjectandi. We
have exploited them, but not for the purpose of explaining 17th century styles of reasoning about
uncertainty, as others have. Rather we have exploited them to develop new idioms of uncertain
reasoning closely related to and substantially generalizing one of the most prominent contemporary
explanatory models, Shafer’s evidence theory, with the prospect of greatly expanding its scope for
applications. As a critical step, this report offers the first explicit solution to a central problem
of uncertain reasoning posed by Bernoulli that has been unsolved for 300 years, in spite of its
publication in a classic text, well-known to the mathematical community during those years.
Appendix: Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem. Let A be a Boolean algebra, pA a probability measure on A . Define FPpA : A ×A →
[0, 1] by: for A1, A2 in A ,
FPpA (A1, A2) = pA (A2 ∨ A
C
1 ).
Then FPpA is an uncertain implication argument and an uncertain inference argument.
Lemma 2.
i. If n is a positive integer,
n∑
m=0
(
n
m
)
(−1)n−m = 0
ii. If A is a Boolean algebra, p : A → [0, 1] is a probability measure and A is an element of A ,
then ∑
A⊆A
(−1)n(A)−n(A)p(A) ≥ 0.0
(These are well-known combinatorial identities).
Uncertain Implication
From the definitions:
←−−−
FPpA (A1, A2) =
∑
A1⊆A3
(−1)n(A1)−n(A3)FP (A3, A2) =
∑
A1⊆A3
(−1)n(A1)−n(A3)pA (A2 ∨ A
C
3 )
If A1 = TA then this sum reduces down to
∑
TA⊆A3
(−1)n(TA )−n(A3)pA (A2 ∨ (A3)
C) = pA (A2) ≥ 0
Otherwise, letting C1 = A
C
1 , C3 = A
C
3 , this is
∑
C3⊆C1
(−1)n(C1)−n(C3)pA (A2 ∨ C3) =
∑
C3⊆C1
(−1)n(C1)−n(C3)pA (A2) +
∑
C3⊆C1
(−1)n(C1)−n(C3)pA (C3 ∧ A
C
2 )
= 0.0 +
∑
C3⊆C1
(−1)n(C1)−n(C3)pA (C3 ∧ A
C
2 )
For C3 contained in C1, consider subsets of C1 related to C3 as follows:{
C ⊆ C1| C ∧ A
C
2 = C3 ∧ A
C
2
}
If D = C3 ∧ A
C
2 these subsets of C1 are described as
{D ∨E| E ⊆ C1 ∧ A2}
The last sum can therefore be redescribed as:
∑
D⊆C1∧AC2
(−1)n(C1∧A
C
2
)−n(D)
∑
E⊆C1∧A2
(−1)n(C1∧A2)−n(E)pA (D)
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But the first factor is 0.0 (from the Lemma) unless C1 ∧ A2 is FA , when
∑
D⊆C2∧AC2
(−1)n(C1∧A2)−n(D)
∑
E⊆FA
(−1)n(FA )−n(E)pA (D) =
∑
D⊆A2∧A1
(−1)n(A2∧A1)−n(D)(1)pA (D) ≥ 0.0
by a previous lemma. In any case, the second factor is ≥ 0.
Uncertain Inference
From the definitions:
−−−→
FPpA (A1, A2) =
∑
A3⊆A2
(−1)n(A2)−n(A3)FP (A1, A3) =
∑
A3⊆A2
(−1)n(A2)−n(A3)pA (A3 ∨ A
C
1 )
If A2 = FA then this sum reduces to
∑
A3⊆FA
(−1)n(FA )−n(A3)pA (A3 ∨ A
C
1 ) = pA (A
C
1 ) ≥ 0
Otherwise,
∑
A3⊆A2
(−1)n(A2)−n(A3)pA (A3 ∨ A
C
1 ) =
∑
A3⊆A2
(−1)n(A2)−n(A3)pA (A
C
1 ) +
∑
A3⊆A2
(−1)n(A2)−n(A3)pA (A3 ∧ A1)
= 0.0 +
∑
A3⊆A2
(−1)n(A2)−n(A3)pA (A3 ∧ A1)
For A3 contained in A2, consider subsets of A2 related to A3 as follows:
{A ⊆ A2| A3 ∧A1 = A ∧ A1}
If D = A3 ∧ A1 these subsets of A2 are described as:
{
D ∨ E| E ⊆ A2 ∧ A
C
1
}
The last sum can therefore be redescribed as:
∑
D⊆A2∧A1
(−1)n(A2∧A1)−n(D)
∑
E⊆A2∧AC1
(−1)n(A2∧A
C
1
)−n(E)pA (D)
But the first factor is 0.0 (from the Lemma) unless A2 ∧ A
C
1 is FA , when
∑
D⊆A2∧A1
(−1)n(A2∧A1)−n(D)
∑
E⊆FA
(−1)n(FA )−n(E)pA (D) =
∑
D⊆A2∧A1
(−1)n(A2∧A1)−n(D)(1)pA (D) ≥ 0.0
by a previous lemma. In any case, the second factor is ≥ 0.
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